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Abstract
In this article we offer an existential theory of well-being that is guided by Heidegger’s later writings on ‘‘homecoming’’. We
approach the question of what it is about the essence of well-being that makes all kinds of well-being possible. Consistent
with a phenomenological approach, well-being is both a way of being-in-the-world, as well as a felt sense of what this is like
as an experience. Drawing on Heidegger’s notion of Gegnet (abiding expanse), we characterise the deepest possibility of
existential well-being as ‘‘dwelling-mobility’’. This term indicates both the ‘‘adventure’’ of being called into expansive
existential possibilities, as well as ‘‘being-at-home-with’’ what has been given. This deepest possibility of well-being carries
with it a feeling of rootedness and flow, peace and possibility. However, we also consider how the separate notions of
existential mobility and existential dwelling as discrete emphases can be developed to describe multiple variations of well-
being possibilities.
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The proper dwelling plight lies in this, that
mortals ever search anew for the essence of
dwelling, that they ever learn to dwell. (Heidegger,
1993a, p. 363)
In this article we offer a theory of well-being that has
been centrally informed by Heidegger’s notion of
‘‘homecoming’’. We do not systematically present
Heidegger’s scholarly exposition and refer readers to
other relevant texts (Heidegger, 1962, 1966, 1971,
1973, 1993a, 1993b). Rather, we will draw on a
particular aspect of Heidegger’s later works in
relation to homecoming and a particular develop-
ment of this that he calls ‘‘Gegnet’’. We pursue the
implications that these aspects of his work provide
for an existential theory of well-being. This theory
includes the notion of ‘‘dwelling’’, the notion of
‘‘mobility’’ and the unity of these two dimensions
(Gegnet as ‘‘abiding expanse’’). More than providing
a philosophical description of ‘‘abiding expanse’’, we
are particularly interested in how this possibility can
be experienced by human beings as a great resource
and possible direction.
Heidegger’s task is philosophical and ontological.
In relation to issues relevant to everyday human
experience, he provides an ontological context; that
is, he concerns himself with what it is about being-
as-such that makes various kinds of human experi-
ences possible. In other words, with reference to the
phenomenon of human well-being, he provides a
framework to approach the question: what is it about
Being that gives to human beings the possibility of
well-being? In drawing on Heidegger’s later works,
we want to note the difference between his task as a
philosopher and our task of trying to understand the
implications of this ontological concern for well-
being as a possibility in human life.
The specific trajectory of Heidegger’s ontological
writings that we wish to draw on concerns how his
notion of homecoming can be usefully extended
towards a more ontic understanding of the nature of
well-being in our daily lives. We do this by building
on a previous paper (Dahlberg, Todres, & Galvin,
2009) in which we articulated well-being as the
intertwining of ‘‘peace’’ and ‘‘movement’’, at meta-
phorical, existential and literal levels. In articulating
(page number not for citation purpose)
Correspondence: Les Todres, Centre for Qualitative Research, Bournemouth University, Royal London House, Bournemouth BH1 3LT, UK.
Tel: 44 1202962169. E-mail: ltodres@bournemouth.ac.uk
Int J Qualitative Stud Health Well-being
#2010 Les Todres and Kathleen Galvin. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1
Citation: Int J Qualitative Stud Health Well-being 2010, 5: 5444 - DOI: 10.3402/qhw.v5i3.5444
the essence of well-being, we also expressed these
notions of peace and movement more metaphori-
cally as ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘adventure’’. In this current
article we wish to expand our earlier notion of peace
towards the more encompassing term ‘‘dwelling’’
and expand our earlier notion of movement towards
the more encompassing term ‘‘mobility’’. More than
this, we will consider how Heidegger’s notion of
‘‘Gegnet’’ can open up an understanding of how
‘‘dwelling’’ and ‘‘mobility’’ are both implicit in the
deepest experience of well-being. We are substan-
tially guided in this trajectory by Mugerauer’s (2008)
book ‘‘Heidegger and Homecoming’’, but wish to use
his analysis in a way that can throw some light on the
phenomenon of human well-being. Mugerauer
helped us to see how a rather obscure idea in
Heidegger’s work, namely ‘‘Gegnet’’, could be highly
productive when trying to integrate the experiences
of movement and stillness.
The discourse that is especially relevant to well-
being occurs in a number of Heidegger’s later works
(1966, 1971, 1973, 1993a, 1993b). In some of these
texts, he describes the ‘‘togetherness’’ of things in an
interrelated horizon that gives space for things and
their movement (‘‘the four-fold’’ of sky, earth,
mortals and divinities). This ‘‘together’’ four-fold is
the source for the possibility of dwelling with things
as they are, and moving with things as they become
what they can. It is this ontological ‘‘togetherness’’,
with its ‘‘horizon’’ of room-making (einraumen),
that provides the template within which human
beings’ experience of ‘‘dwelling with’’, and ‘‘moving
with’’, can be credibly understood.
The ontological possibility of well-being: the
harmony of dwelling and mobility
Heidegger’s (1993a, 1993b) introduction of the
four-fold, sky, earth, mortals and divinities is his
way of indicating an alternative ontological context
for the relationship between Being and beings, an
alternative to the technological perspective of the
western metaphysical tradition. The western meta-
physical tradition posits neutral space within which
one can ‘‘put’’ beings and things, and time is the
neutral context in which all things happen sequen-
tially. But Heidegger was concerned that this meta-
physical framework missed a ‘‘cosmos’’ in which
Being was not just space and time (merely a neutral
context), but a wholeness that was more intimately
implicated in the way beings are related to one
another and Being-as-a-whole. This relatedness is
both a relatedness of movement and a relatedness of
kinship, and is indicated in Heidegger’s (1966)
notion of Gegnet.
Gegnet gives both a continuity between Being and
beings, as well as a rupture, so that beings can
become figural and stand out of their ground.
Gegnet means open expanse or abiding expanse,
but it is at the same time also a gathering. ‘The
gathering is a multidimensional letting’ (Mugerauer,
2008, p. 467).
Human beings are intimately implicated in
Gegnet by being the ‘‘there’’ of being, the ‘‘place’’
where there is a clearing for the gatherings of beings
and things; in this way being-as-such does not
happen without human being.
Heidegger then also offers a consideration of how
this ontological context above can be relevant for the
ontic everyday lives of human beings. Can a human
being remember his or her own dwelling in Being
while also sojourning in the ‘‘mobility-current’’ of
being, thus called into a novel future? We would like
to leave this ontological analysis for now, and
consider how this framework may play out in relation
to the human experience of well-being.
Delineating the phenomenon of human
well-being
In his book ‘‘The Hermeneutics of Medicine and the
Phenomenology of Health’’, Svenaeus (2000) draws
on Heidegger’s (1962) Being and Time and the
‘‘Zollikon Seminars’’ (Heidegger, 2001) to progress
a view of health as ‘‘homelike being-in-the world’’:
‘‘Health is to be understood as a being-at-home that
keeps the not-being-at-home in the world from
becoming apparent’’ (Svenaeus, 2000, p. 93). In
this current article we cannot do justice to all the
ways that Svenaeus insightfully elaborates this
theme. However, building on some of these insights
we would like to concentrate more on how the
phenomenon of ‘‘homelessness’’, although never
fully eradicated, can become reframed within a
more encompassing possibility of homecoming: the
possibility of finding home within the homeless.
The journey through homelessness before
authentic homecoming
In Being and Time Heidegger refers to a form of
being-at-home (zuhause) that is inauthentic in that
human beings can take excessive refuge in ‘‘das
man’’ or ‘‘the man-in-general’’. Such taken for
granted familiarity constitutes a kind of ‘‘at home-
ness’’, but at great cost to what he sees as the
possibility of taking on a life of one’s own.
The numbing comfort of this taken for granted
familiarity is in Heidegger’s view not sustainable
as human finitude and vulnerability inevitably
announce themselves in many ways. In his analysis
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of the journey towards authenticity, he emphasises
the importance of anxiety as a form of attunement
that opens up a certain aloneness in facing the
uncertain cares of one’s personal life that is always
in the shadow of its potential falling away. Heidegger
uses the term ‘‘uncanniness’’ (unheimleich) to
indicate this kind of existential homelessness that is
faced when one is able to embrace the ‘‘resolute’’
responsibility of moving away from the ‘‘taken for
granted’’ securities of the familiar ’’at-homeness’’.
Within this perspective, ill health can be one of the
ways in which human vulnerability reminds us of an
existential homelessness that cannot be denied.
Illness then can be ‘‘a wake up call’’ to face
existential tasks that may have been avoided. If
Heidegger just left us here he would leave us in
quite a nihilistic position in which we have to
stoically come to terms with our homelessness. But
later, in what Mugerauer (2008) calls ‘‘the homey
papers’’, Heidegger articulates another kind of
homecoming which is authentically possible for
human beings: a movement from the inauthenticity
of a familiar being-at-home (zuhause) through a
more authentic embrace of existential homelessness
to the possibility of an authentic homecoming.
Facing this ‘‘not being at home’’, although an
anxiety-provoking experience, can also open up a
path of movement; and this can provide an energis-
ing potential that can itself be felt as well-being.
Homelessness paradoxically provides an important
motivation for the quest to seek the experience of
homecoming. Our theory of well-being thus wishes
to incorporate the value of experiences of home-
lessness as well as experiences of homecoming. As
will be shown, homelessness gives mobility to life as
a positive potential, while homecoming gives peace
to life as a positive potential.
An existential theory of well-being as
‘‘dwelling-mobility’’
The following exposition of our existential theory of
well-being first articulates existential mobility and
existential dwelling as distinct dimensions before
considering them together, and dialectically, as the
unity of dwelling-mobility.
Existential mobility
In many different ways Heidegger conveyed how
homelessness does not just bring insecurity, but also
provides the ontological possibilities of authentic
movement or what we call ‘‘existential mobility’’.
Homelessness carries with it a sense of unfinished-
ness that seeks future possibilities, people and
projects. It is a creative restlessness in which we are
called into our future possibilities. We could say that
it is a kind of ‘‘eros’’ or energy which can give a
feeling of flow, aliveness and vibrant movement.
When called in this way we may feel connected to
our life’s desires. We can also metaphorise this
movement as a ‘‘sense of adventure’’. Therefore,
such existential mobility forms one of the dimen-
sions of our theory of well-being.
Although they do not use this term, it could be
said that the writings of Boss (1979), Gadamer
(1996) and Toombs (1993) emphasise this notion
of existential mobility in their considerations of well-
being. In this view, well-being is about the access
to one’s existential possibilities in time and space,
with one’s body and with others. In emphasising the
notion of possibilities, we are also emphasising
the ‘‘forward moving’’ quality of living towards the
future and finding meaningful projects there. For
Boss (1979), well-being is understood as all the ways
in which we are able to have access to, and actualise
a full range of experiential and behavioural possibi-
lities as articulated by Heidegger in Being and Time.
These possibilities, which Heidegger called ‘‘exis-
tentiale’’, include spatiality, temporality, intersubjec-
tivity, embodiment and mood. For Boss, to restore
well-being is to restore ones potential to be con-
nected in all of these ways. Thus, for example, to
help restore a depressed person’s temporal range, the
psychotherapist becomes interested in the ways in
which the future has become uninviting to the
person; to help restore well-being for a person whose
physical movement is very limited, a helper may
focus on the well-being possibilities of facilitating
contact with greater spatial horizons through acces-
sing beautiful and expansive sights, smells and
sounds; to help restore well-being in an ill person
isolated in intensive care, a mere human touch or
voice may be the intersubjective welcome that is
needed to invite the person out of their sense of
isolation. In his writings on health and well-being,
Gadamer (1996) indicated how healthy people are
embodied in such a way that they are unpreoccupied
with their physical condition, thus free to participate
in all the powers that their bodies afford. Also,
Toombs (1993) provides a number of descriptions of
ill health as the truncation of, or deficit in, healthy
existential possibilities of spatiality, temporality,
intersubjectivity, embodiment and mood. Both
Heidegger and Boss have emphasised how these
different existential possibilities are equi-primordial,
that is, that they are all implicated in one another
without privileging any one of them in a way that sets
up any particular existential dimension as primary.
Our theory of well-being, in its emphasis on
‘‘existential mobility’’, is thus interested in all of
the ways one can experience existential mobility with
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different emphases. However, this dimension of
‘‘existential mobility’’ alone is at risk of obscuring
another equally important but distinctive dimension
of well-being: the dimension that we call ‘‘existential
dwelling’’.
Existential dwelling
In his later work, Heidegger became more focused
on a kind of existential homecoming that authenti-
cally grounds the human potentiality for a peaceful
attunement to existence. In his writings on ‘‘letting-
be-ness’’ (Gelassenheit), and ‘‘making a space for’’,
Heidegger articulated the possibility of a human
relationship to being that was characterised by
acceptance and the possibility of peace. Already in
Being and Time there was a concern to face and come
to terms with finitude and the existential vulnerabil-
ities of existence. There is some question here about
the extent to which such ‘‘coming to terms’’ was a
true acceptance rather than a resolute form of
courage to bear ones aloneness and responsibility.
After what has been called the ‘‘turning’’ (Kehre),
Heidegger concerns himself much more directly
with the kind of comportment required that allows
Being and beings ‘‘to be’’. He believed that this had
great import for a philosophical project that tries to
think Being in a fresh way that is more original than
traditional Western Metaphysical frameworks. How-
ever, implicit in this we also find some important
clues for a more peaceful attunement to life’s
everyday vicissitudes. In the comportment of
‘‘Gelassenheit’’ or ‘‘letting-be-ness’’ there is an
openness to allow whatever is there to simply be
present in the manner that it is present, before one
rushes in to try to change it. We would like to express
the essence of this quality in the term ‘‘existential
dwelling’’. To dwell is to come home to one’s
situation, to hear what is there, to abide, to linger
and to be gathered there with what belongs there.
When such dwelling is able to be fully supported,
there may be a mood of peacefulness. But peace-
fulness is only one possible attunement within
dwelling. The essence of dwelling is simply the
willingness to be there, whatever this ‘‘being there’’
is like. One can come to dwelling in many ways such
as sadness, suffering, concern, attentiveness, accep-
tance, relaxation or patience. Dwelling is intentional
in its attunement in that it allows the world, the
body, things, others and the flow of time to be what
it is. It is a form of being grounded in the present
moment, supported by a past that is arriving and the
openness of a future that is calling. Dwelling makes
room for all this. Although peacefulness and ‘‘being
at one’’ with ‘‘what is there’’ is its deepest calling and
possibility, such homecoming is invariably through
homelessness if it is to be authentic. To dwell is to
‘‘come home’’ to what is there with oneself and the
world, whatever the qualities of that may be.
There is a paradox to existential dwelling. In
coming home to what ‘‘is there’’, there is not
necessarily an eradication of suffering, pain and the
existential vicissitudes of life. So how can such
dwelling constitute a core dimension of well-being?
What is it about this dwelling that can be called well-
being? Just this: that there is a felt quality to ‘‘making
room for’’ and ‘‘letting-be-ness’’ that constitutes a
kind of peace, in spite of everything, that is different
from the kind of peace that depends on the eradica-
tion of limiting conditions. If we were to follow
Heidegger’s project to speak the possibility of
possibilities, we would say that, in existential dwell-
ing, human being is inhering in Being; that is, that
such dwelling is not just a psychological state but a
description of a relationship of belonging between
human being and her/his ground.
Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish the two
dimensions of mobility and dwelling: mobility
emphasises the call of the future and the energetic
feeling of possibility; dwelling emphasises a settling
into the present moment with its acceptance of
things as they are. In his later work, however,
Heidegger opened up the term ‘‘Gegnet’’ and offers
a way to speak of how dwelling and mobility can
come together as an integrated unified experience
that forms the deepest possibility of well-being. We
thus now turn to Gegnet and what we have called
‘‘dwelling-mobility’’.
Dwelling-mobility: Gegnet
In this section we wish to consider how Heidegger’s
notion of Gegnet may help us to think about the
ultimate essential unity of mobility and dwelling in
the context of well-being.
Heidegger never eradicates the givenness of home-
lessness, but what he does open up at various levels
and stages is a space in which homelessness does not
exclude the possibility of well-being. This kind of
well-being has to be inclusive enough in order to
hold open the possibility of homecoming within
homelessness. He thus had to find a language and
a way of thinking that could express this paradox.
Because the words ‘‘dwelling’’ and ‘‘mobility’’,
‘‘home’’ and ‘‘homelessness’’ divert attention from
each other, it is difficult to imagine how both these
dimensions can live together as a source of well-
being. But we can do this by unfolding some of
the implications of Heidegger’s use of the term
‘‘Gegnet’’ in an ontological context. Mugerauer
(2008) provides a useful summary of what is meant
by the term:
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Gegnet is the opening that lets the horizon come
forth as horizon, permits all to shelter, and lets
everything come back home to its ownness,
which is, at one and the same time, in/as their
belonging together. ‘‘To the already potent figure
of homecoming in ‘return to itself ’, Heidegger
adds the long-anticipated, long held off final
possibility of completion: opening gathers and
returns everything ‘to rest in its own abiding’ to
rest, to stay at home in itself and to that to which it
belongs.’’ (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 467)
Implicit in this idea of Gegnet as ‘‘gathering in the
abiding expanse’’ is a sense in which there is both the
freedom and openness of mobility (being called into
the novelty of open horizons) as well as the ‘‘coming
back home to itself ’’ of dwelling (resting in the
peacefulness of its own abiding). This togetherness
of mobility and dwelling provides the possibility of
well-being with both a ‘‘rootedness’’ as well as a
‘‘flow’’. This rooted flow, this ‘‘dwelling-mobility’’,
is a space in which ‘‘homecoming’’ can be found by
embracing ‘‘homelessness’’. So, in Gegnet, there is
always already the togetherness of dwelling and
mobility. To sojourn in ‘‘dwelling-mobility’’ is to . . .
‘‘endure in the abiding expanse’’ (Mugerauer, 2008,
p. 469).
Summary of existential theory of well-being:
dwelling-mobility
In this theory we approached the question of what
it is about well-being that makes all kinds of well-
being possible. Thus, our phenomenon is about the
structure of well-being before any particular cate-
gorisation of well-being, such as, for example,
physical well-being, social well-being, emotional
well-being and economic well-being. Our structure
of well-being thus makes these categorical forms of
well-being possible and provides the essence of well-
being that coheres through all its variations.
Consistent with a phenomenological approach,
well-being is both a way of being-in-the-world, as
well as how this way of being-in the-world is felt as
an experience.
The deepest possibility of existential well-being
lies in the unity of dwelling-mobility. Guided by
Heidegger’s notion of Gegnet, dwelling-mobility
describes both the ‘‘adventure’’ of being called into
existential possibilities as well as the ‘‘being at home
with’’ what has been given. This deepest possibility
carries with it a feeling of rootedness and flow, peace
and possibility.
However, the variations of well-being lie in the
dialectic of mobility and dwelling, as well as the
relative emphasis that each dimension offers as a
possible variation of well-being.
The essence of mobility lies in all the ways in
which we are called into the existential possibilities
of moving forward with time, space, others, mood
and our bodies. The feeling of this ‘‘moving for-
ward’’ is one of energised flow.
The essence of dwelling lies in all the ways that we
existentially ‘‘come home’’ to what we have been
given in time, space, others, mood and our bodies.
The feeling of this ‘‘coming home’’ is one of
acceptance, ‘‘rootedness’’ and peace.
Well-being, as we have articulated it, is a positive
possibility that is independent of health and illness,
but is a resource for both. In other words, well-being
can be found within illness and well-being is more
than health. However, we wish to acknowledge that
well-being, as an ontic everyday experience, is never
complete, but something of the essence of well-being
provides a possibility that always calls and can
shine through. As such, our theory of well-being as
‘‘dwelling-mobility’’ describes a capacity for move-
ment and a capacity for settling.
Well-being possibilities: kinds and levels of
well-being
Gegnet as an experiential possibility is inclusive of all
the kinds and levels of well-being. It would appear to
be an existential possibility that calls to us from deep
within embodied being. In a sense, the body knows
this unity of dwelling-mobility, even though one’s life
circumstances and conscious experience may not
often present this deepest possibility of well-being.
However the emphases that we have articulated as
mobility and dwelling can also provide a conceptual
foundation for considering various levels and kinds
of well-being that stop short of the unity of dwelling-
mobility. We would like to offer several kinds of well-
being experiences in which dwelling and mobility
occur with a number of different emphases. These
emphases are informed by the following lifeworld
constituents as articulated by Husserl and elaborated
by Heidegger: spatiality, temporality, intersubjec-
tivity, mood and embodiment. When dwelling is
experienced in a spatial way, one has a sense of being
at home; when mobility is experienced in a spatial
way, one has a sense of adventure. When dwelling is
experienced in a temporal way, there is a sense of
being grounded in the present moment; when
mobility is experienced in a temporal way, there is
a sense of temporal ‘‘flow’’ and forward movement.
When dwelling is experienced in an intersubjective
way, there is a sense of kinship and belonging;
when mobility is experienced in an intersubjective
way, there is a sense of mysterious interpersonal
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attraction. When dwelling is experienced as
mood, there is a sense of peace; when mobility is
experienced as mood, there is a sense of excitement
or desire. When dwelling is experienced as a form of
personal identity, there is a sense of ‘‘being at one
with’’ the world; when mobility is experienced as a
form of personal identity, there is sense of ‘‘I can’’.
When dwelling is experienced in an embodied way,
there is a sense of comfort; when mobility is
experienced in an embodied way, there is a sense
of vitality.
All these experiential qualities, although overlap-
ping, provide distinctive nuances or emphases. As
such they can provide a conceptual framework
for the range of distinctive resources that can be
drawn upon or developed on in peoples’ well-being
journeys.
If one was trying to take this framework into a
more applied direction, one would be concerned
with facilitating possibilities for ‘‘movement’’, as well
as possibilities for ‘‘letting-be-ness’’ at both existen-
tial and literal levels.
We cannot in this article pursue these applications
in detail. This is the subject of a future article. The
practical applications, however, proceed from a
thoughtfulness about different kinds of mobility
and dwelling at literal, metaphorical and existential
levels, and how these different possible variations
may be experienced within the context of funda-
mental lifeworld structures (existentiale) such as
temporality, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatial-
ity and mood. This sensitising (rather than prescrip-
tive) way to consider the kind and level of well-being
that may be possible in a concrete circumstance may
offer some practical directions. So, for example,
informed by the theory, one may think of one kind of
possible well-being variation as ‘‘spatial mobility’’,
another as ‘‘temporal mobility’’, and another as
‘‘mooded dwelling’’, etc. In thinking about the
question of what spatial mobility is possible for a
person, one could, together with a person who has
complex disabilities, and can’t go outside, consider
what expansive spatial horizons may be possible
within that context. An example of ‘‘temporal
mobility’’ may refer to the challenge of how to help
a person access past memories (move into the past)
when their short-term memory is failing. An exam-
ple of ‘‘mooded dwelling’’ may refer to the challenge
of how to help a person feel more peaceful and ‘‘at
home’’ in a busy clinical care environment.
So, the theory itself may begin to provide a way
of thinking about what the ontic possibilities and
variations of well-being could be within the ontology
of well-being as a human possibility.
Within this perspective of well-being, people find
their own unique way towards well-being, and there
is a play between all these nuances, one’s personal
history, and the limitations that life presents. But in
all these variations, the body knows something about
well-being as ‘‘dwelling-mobility’’, and such tacit-
knowing forms the experiential touchstone for guid-
ing our quest towards homecoming within the
homeless.
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